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Abstract
In the present essay we attempt to reconstruct Newtonian mechanics under the guidance of 
logical principles and of a constructive approach related to the genetic epistemology of Pia-
get and García (Psychogenesis and the history of science, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1989). Instead of addressing Newton’s equations as a set of axioms, ultimately given 
by the revelation of a prodigious mind, we search for the fundamental knowledge, beliefs 
and provisional assumptions that can produce classical mechanics. We start by develop-
ing our main tool: the no arbitrariness principle, that we present in a form that is apt for a 
mathematical theory as classical mechanics. Subsequently, we introduce the presence of 
the observer, analysing then the relation objective–subjective and seeking objectivity going 
across subjectivity. We take special care of establishing the precedence among all contri-
butions to mechanics, something that can be better appreciated by considering the conse-
quences of removing them: (a) the consequence of renouncing logic and the laws of under-
standing is not being able to understand the world, (b) renouncing the early elaborations of 
primary concepts such as time and space leads to a dissociation between everyday life and 
physics, the latter becoming entirely pragmatic and justified a-posteriori (because it is con-
venient), (c) changing our temporary beliefs has no real cost other than effort. Finally, we 
exemplify the present approach by reconsidering the constancy of the velocity of light. It is 
shown that it is a result of Newtonian mechanics, rather than being in contradiction with it. 
We also indicate the hidden assumption that leads to the (apparent) contradiction.
Keywords Newtonian mechanics · No arbitrariness principle · Objective versus subjective 
description · Law of inertia · Central forces · Energy conservation · Laws of nature · 
Genetic epistemology
1 Introduction
Probably every physics student has wondered what is behind Newton’s laws. Some may 
even have read the Principia (Newton 1687) looking for an answer, just to find a few indi-
cations in the introduction followed by a large hiatus taking them directly to Newton’s 
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axioms, with no clue on how to produce them. While some everyday experiences can be 
used to grasp the first and third law, the second law appears to be arbitrary (to say the 
least). Are there principles operating behind the laws? Is there a unity among them? What 
do they hide? These questions have bugged all scientists exposed to physics as they have 
bugged us since we were students. They are relevant for the constructivist approach known 
as second order science (Mueller 2014; Lissack 2017) as well. Are the foundations of phys-
ics intuitions of powerful minds subject to no other rule than an a posteriori test of useful-
ness? Are they useful pragmatic beliefs subject to no rule of construction [an idea going 
back at least to Peirce (Hartshorne and Weiss 1931; Burks 1946)] to be replaced only when 
a new genius handles us a new set of axioms? Is then reasoning in physics restricted to the 
deductive form, to instrumental reason? Or is there room for critical reason searching for 
the foundations? Shouldn’t a philosophy of physics follow Hegel’s dictum: “progress in 
philosophy is rather a retrogression and a grounding or establishing by means of which we 
first obtain the result that what we began with is not something merely arbitrarily assumed 
but is in fact the truth, and also the primary truth.” (Hegel 2001, par.101)?
On the utilitarian side, reasoning is the most powerful adaptation of the animal we call 
human being to the conditions of Nature, for reason allows humans to foresee the outcomes 
of events and to act taking advantage of opportunities, avoiding dangers and unfavourable 
conditions. As a consequence, inasmuch as reasoning enhances adaptive capabilities, it is 
a part of natural selection. This selection took place in front of the difficulties placed by 
natural phenomena.
On the idealistic side, a long-term desire of mankind is to understand Nature. What is 
implied in it? Understanding Nature is a search for harmony, it means trying to see how 
all apparent contingencies (good or bad) are in fact aspects of different expressions of the 
totality implied in Nature (or can be constructed as such). Even in the quest for under-
standing elusive matters as mathematical chaos, the intellectual exercise is not an apol-
ogy of what exists beyond all possible organisation/understanding but rather, to find the 
perspective that allows us to see harmony in what, at first sight, was perceived as disorder 
(Solari et al. 1996). This view is related to the concept of praxis, which in phenomenology 
is considered “a human activity that is pursued as an end in itself, that is, a terminal goal of 
human living rather than as practical problem-solving (techne)” (Heelan and Tymieniecka 
2003).
Understanding Nature demands the development of several processes, being the most 
immediate one to strip off the particularities that dress observations (in relation to the mat-
ter under discussion), thus disclosing properties common to them and relations that often 
have been named the essence (Husserl 1983). This process is associated to abstraction. We 
emphasise here that in these terms, essence is not absolute but instead relative to the posed 
questions.
For example, for any discussion of the biomechanics of a horse, the colour of its coat is 
irrelevant, yet if what we are to discuss is the “market price” of the horse, the coat usually 
plays a significant role in a predictive theory. The reader may want to distinguish the act 
of abstracting away colour when considering biomechanics from more demanding ideali-
sations requiring some sort of extrapolation such as e.g., regarding the dynamics of fric-
tionless bodies as the (unattainable) limit of the behaviour of bodies subject to different 
degrees of friction. For this process Galileo used the word idealisation [see e.g., Discorsi 
e Dimostrazioni Matematiche Intorno a Due Nuove Scienze (Galilei 1914, day 4)]. We will 
use in the sequel the word idealisation without distinguishing between both types of pro-
cesses (we notice that Husserl used the word ideation for the process of intuition trans-
forming the observed into ideas). In this process of idealisation experience is put in terms 
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of relations between idealised (abstract) objects through synthetic judgements (Kant). 
These relations are tentative and are always to be suspected of being in contradiction with 
new observations; we call them theories.
Descartes introduced the expression “laws of Nature” referring to principles of phys-
ics concerning the motion of bodies [Discourse on method (Descartes 2015, p. 19)]. The 
dogma that Nature follows its own laws, which can then be discovered, soon gave birth to a 
new child: Newton’s laws, presented in his Philosophiœ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, 
(Newton 1687). These developments represent the beginning of the scientific revolution 
which includes the mathematisation of the idealised relations (Galileo) and a reconstruc-
tion of the idea of “cause” to be compatible with idealised relations. Yet, Aristotle’s dictum 
“we think we do not have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why, that is to 
say, its cause” (Aristotle, 1994–2010) remained valid. In this sense, the quest of knowledge 
maintained a continuity from the ancient greeks to the modern scientists.
The understanding of causative relations is the long-term programme of science. How-
ever, the relation of cause and effect is not free of debate. It was tackled by Hume (1896) 
as a necessary relation between contiguous objects. For Hume, causes must always precede 
effects. As realised later by Russell (1912–1913), cause became a confusing term seldom 
used by scientists. He indicated that instead of causes scientists use “state functional rela-
tions between certain events at earlier and later times or at the same time”, he uses the 
name determinants for these events. Both the determinants and the relations are necessary 
to answer Aristotle’s question: why it happens? and as such, they are Aristotelian causes.
In the crusade for the “elimination of metaphysics”, Carnap (1959) asserts “we say of a 
thing or process y that it ’arises out of’ x when we observe that things or processes of kind 
x are frequently or invariably followed by things or processes of kind y (causal connection 
in the sense of a lawful succession).” Cause in Carnap takes the form of a relation between 
observed things or processes, insisting in Hume’s old empiricist view. Let us challenge 
such extreme empiricist notion. Consider a rectangular cloth suspended by strings tied to 
its four corners. If we let a ball rest on the cloth we observe a deformation of the cloth and 
the formation of some wrinkles that evidence tensions. Is the ball the cause of the wrinkles 
and the deformation? Or perhaps the wrinkles have attracted the ball? Such a simple matter 
is not easy to decide using Carnap’s dictum. The deformation and the presence of the ball 
resting on the cloth are simultaneous; there is no precedence in time. However, it has never 
been observed that by making wrinkles on a cloth we can attract balls in the surroundings. 
Clearly, we say that the ball is the cause of the deformation and the wrinkles [this example 
is adapted from Kant (1787,  p. 183)]. Thus, causes can very well be simultaneous with 
effects and the decision about what is the cause of a phenomenon is taken based on reason 
and on other experiences. But physics requires more than this type of analysis. Take the 
ball, lift it and let it drop. Is there a relation between what makes the ball fall and the cloth 
to wrinkle? We all know that there is a relation between not-falling (staying on the cloth) 
and wrinkles, and both events point towards an element left outside in the previous analy-
sis: gravitation. Without gravitation (or with lesser gravitation) we would observe no (or 
smaller) deformation, and no (or slower) fall. Gravitation can be inferred but not observed 
(the same can be said of tension). In our observations, gravitation is acting as a necessary 
element in our explanation, i.e., a cause in Aristotle’s perception. Thus, if we want to con-
struct knowledge we have to abandon the crusade against metaphysics and allow ingredi-
ents that are produced by our mind; in this case elements such as gravitation that are not 
sensible but rather inferred (call them meta-sensible if it pleases the reader). We shall call 
them metaphysical (where does physics end?). We notice that by so doing the time-order 
between causes and effects is erased to a good extent, for gravitation is there before, during 
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and after the time the ball rests on the cloth, although what it counts for us is that it was 
before and during the experiment. The fall of the ball on the cloth (with the subsequent 
coming to rest) and the wrinkles are the result of at least one common cause. In the empiri-
cist view, metaphysics is not absent but rather hidden in habits and commonplaces. We 
cannot account for experience without some degree of idealisation, i.e., metaphysics. We 
observe that putting metaphysics back into science is suggested as well in Lissack (2017).
Our use of cause will indicate relations of the kind described by Russell unless other-
wise stated. For example, we will later state that “force is the cause of acceleration” since 
force expresses a functional relation between a change in velocity, time and other physical 
characteristics. Notice that in this case there are no determinants.
Equipped with reasoning, idealisation and an understanding of cause in order to address 
natural phenomena, in the present work we will try to distinguish the diverse elements that 
contribute to the construction of classical (Newtonian) mechanics elaborating from the 
construction of reality in childhood as described by genetic epistemology. We find three 
clear sources for these contributions, namely: (a) requisites of reason, named principles (b) 
intuitive building blocks that are constitutive of our understanding after their production 
in our early contact with the world (called axioms) and (3) provisional assumptions with 
respect to the organisation of the sensible world which, as pragmatical beliefs (Hartshorne 
and Weiss 1931), are the main target of procedures such as falsation (or falsification) (Pop-
per 1959) and retroduction (often called abduction) (Hartshorne and Weiss 1931; Burks 
1946).
With the word principle we mean a requisite of reason prior to any theorisation or 
empiric tests. Two principles will be stated in the next section, being the Principle of no 
Arbitrariness (NAP) the most far-reaching. We note on passing that the word “principle” 
has other uses as well (e.g., Newton’s third law is also called the Principle of Action and 
Reaction). As for axioms, they are broad building blocks that constitute the basis of a the-
ory. In theories about Nature, axioms are to a large extent motivated by the way human 
beings relate to Nature and may be questioned if they fail in this respect. Axioms are 
related to intuitions in Husserl’s phenomenology (Husserl 1983), since we proceed first by 
removing spatio-temporal determinants and further incorporating the concept (the essence, 
Eidos). Husserl states “seeing an essence is precisely intuition”. Within a mathematical 
theory, however, the axioms are accepted without need for proof. Assumptions, in turn, are 
local decisions in order to limit the scope of the theory according to the desired goals. Con-
sider for example: “in the sequel we consider forces of instantaneous action at a distance”. 
The axioms and previous theory may encompass other types of forces as well, but our local 
interest in a given context is delimited by making this (or other) assumption. Mathematical 
theories of Nature are usually built up by axioms and assumptions, where axioms represent 
our intuition of Nature, our experience, and are the starting point of empiricist theories. We 
add here a higher level to this structure which comes from the subject and it precedes and 
rules intuitions. We argue that this principle is a fundamental element in Physics.
This work is the result of an interplay between philosophy, psychology, mathematics 
and physics, traditions of thoughts that we do not conceive as autonomous but rather differ-
ent realisations of the same general form that we call reason, this is, reason as it is needed 
in this or that field of use (application). The reader not familiar with this synthetic form, 
and perhaps not comfortable in all of the particular forms is invited to skip the unfriendly 
details in a first reading. For example, proofs are unavoidable for mathematicians but phys-
icists will often adopt a “for the moment I trust you” attitude in a first reading.
The mathematisation of NAP is in Sect. 2, the application of NAP to space and time 
and a new insight into Galileo’s transformations is to be found in Sect. 3. Sections 4 and 5 
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show how NAP enters in Newton’s laws. These two sections contain the most demanding 
mathematics. Section 6 is devoted to reflecting about Newton’s mechanics with connec-
tions to other criticisms and analyses of Newton’s work. Section 7 treats the speed of light 
within the Newtonian system. We first show that what is measured is expected to be inde-
pendent of the Galilean frame. Next we uncover a hidden assumption that leads to the well-
known problem between a constant speed of light, Newton’s law and the hidden assump-
tion. Readers mainly interested in this matter may want to skip Sects. 4 and 5 (Sect. 3 is 
required). Within this discussion the last mathematical difficulty appears in Sect.  7.1.2 
where we adopt, for the sake of the exercise, absolute time and absolute space showing that 
even substantivalists (Maudlin 1993) have options within the Newtonian world to account 
for a constant speed of light. This is an example of how constructivism offers new forms of 
thinking physical problems. Finally Sect. 8 sums up the manuscript.
Natives of psychology and philosophy will have to endure our speaking of those sub-
jects as foreigners. Further, we do not pretend to be disciplinary experts in all of the above 
mentioned fields, rather we use the disciplined thought to corroborate, support and sharpen 
our own (free) thinking. The reader is warned that this work is made of undisciplined 
thinking more in the “prophetic tradition” than in the “scholastic” one (Nisbet 1971).
2  No Arbitrariness Principle
In any rational construction attempting to logically articulate the natural world, we are 
bound to keep elements not based in reason or evidence outside the construction if pos-
sible. Since what is determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, 
or principle is called arbitrary,1 we adopt the attitude of rejecting arbitrary practices. If it 
were not possible to achieve a full exclusion of arbitrariness, we must make sure that the 
arbitrariness introduced plays no role in answering valid questions with respect to Nature. 
While it is certainly possible to uproot the questions whose answers depend on arbitrary 
decisions, in constructing a theory we must strive to avoid the arbitrariness as much as pos-
sible and to keep the valid questions as broad as possible.
This approach to understanding will be called the No Arbitrariness Principle. Resigning 
this principle i.e., admitting arbitrariness as a basic ingredient, would render communica-
tion extremely difficult. The principle delimits the conditions with which knowledge about 
Nature is to develop. As such, it is therefore prior to physics and experience and cannot 
be questioned empirically. In a theory of natural phenomena, subsequent axioms and even 
more assumptions are connected to empiric evidence and may be falsified empirically, thus 
suggesting the need for a more adequate theory.
Struggling to avoid arbitrariness in a physical description immediately reflects in the 
invariance of this description with respect to elections for which we do not have a reason-
able foundation. For example, measurements imply comparisons and the units of measure-
ment are arbitrary to a good extent, yet velocity will always be written in terms of a ratio 
between distance and time. This form is independent of arbitrary choices of units, although 
the figure of the velocity changes according to the chosen units.
Within the mathematical theory we are about to develop, we will formulate these ideas 
as principles:
1 See for example, The Free Dictionary, https ://www.thefr eedic tiona ry.com/.
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Principle 1 There is a material world we perceive with our senses (including experiments).
We call this world Nature and we strive to find laws that describe its perceived organisa-
tion. In this context we state the main idea of this work:
Principle 2 [No Arbitrariness Principle (NAP)] No knowledge of Nature depends on arbi-
trary decisions.
In short, NAP establishes that: If there is no reason for it, we shall make no difference. 
In this simple form it can be recognised as Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason (Ballard 
1960) put in a cognitive context.2
The arbitrary decisions adopted while constructing a theory can be viewed as forming a 
group of transformations operating over the laws and/or the magnitudes involved in the the-
ory. Each choice of elements in the set of arbitrary assumptions is used to produce a presenta-
tion of the theory and all presentations must be equivalent, i.e., conjugated by elements of the 
group of arbitrary decisions (we will formalise this idea in mathematical terms in Sect. 2.2).
It is important to notice that this approach evolves from the construction of reality by 
the child. We quote Piaget on groups: “There is a mutual dependence between group and 
object; the permanence of objects presupposes elaboration of the group of their displace-
ments and vice-versa. On the other hand, everything justifies us in centering our descrip-
tion of the genesis of space around that of the concept of group. Geometrically, ever since 
H. Poincaré this concept has appeared as a prime essential to the interpretation of displace-
ments [...] But it is necessary to remember that we shall attribute the widest meaning to 
this concept for if, as recent works have shown, the logical definition of the group is inex-
haustible and involves the most essential processes of thought, it is possible, purely from 
our psychological point of view, to consider as a group every system of operations capable 
of permitting a return to the point of departure.” (Piaget 1999)
2.1  Objectivity and Intersubjectivity
If we observe a cat stalking a bird in our garden, we perceive a distance between cat and 
bird and we have indications that both cat and bird perceive something similar, since the 
cat does not launch the attack until the distance is short enough and the bird does not fly 
away until the cat is threatening close.
2 The principle of sufficient reason (PSR) has made little or no progress since the Clarke–Leibniz polemic 
(Ballard 1960). A discussion among substantivalists and relationalists has re-emerged with Relativity The-
ory but in a form in which philosophy is subordinated to the “success” of physics. Within such an intel-
lectual disposition it has been declared that “neither the PSR nor the PII enjoys at present unquestionable 
philosophical credentials” (Maudlin 1993) (PII stands for Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles). Actually, 
the discussion appears as frozen in time, lacking critical contributions and it still revolves around God. In 
contrast, NAP stands for a critical as well as operative view, it has a long tradition in mathematics where the 
expression “without lost of generality we can assume...” is frequent in proofs, meaning that the results will 
not depend on our arbitrary choices but for the sake of the argument a choice must be made. This is: arbi-
trariness should not and will not bear any consequence in what is being proved. The metacognitive instruc-
tion received by every student of physics: “the final result should not depend in your election of units or 
your choice of path to reach it” manifests the same conviction: arbitrariness has no part in truth.
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In the next Section we will formalise these perceptions in the concept of relative position, 
saying that it is objective (as well as cat and bird are), while our perceptions of it are intersub-
jective, meaning that the cat’s, bird’s and any observer’s perceptions can be put in one-to-one 
correspondence. In most of the text we will make no difference between objective and inter-
subjective. When we make a difference it corresponds to the fact that for sensible objects we 
produce the internal representation by experience or intuition (eidetic seeing or ideation in 
Husserl) leaving aside contingent elements, but there are other objects (essence, Eidos) which 
are the datum of eidetic intuition (Husserl 1983). Thus we call ’objective’ representations pro-
duced by ideation and ’intersubjective’ all representations irrespective of the origin. As such, 
space is objective but time is only intersubjective. A corresponding distinction was made by 
(Kant 1787) in his discussion of “the a priori of knowledge”.
The internal representations need not be the same but just corresponding ones. Let xCB 
be a symbol for the idea of relative position between cat and bird. We are used to think that 
the observer a represents it as xCB = xaC − xaB , which is in fact a synthetic judgement—not a 
mathematical one—since it proposes a relation between three different concepts: the posi-
tions xa
C
 , xa
B
 of cat and bird relative to the observer (or to a reference of her/his choice) and 
the relative position between cat and bird xCB . Since the observer entered the picture by the 
arbitrary action of referring positions with respect to her/himself, this expression must be 
subject to the no arbitrariness principle, NAP. It is important to realise that xCB is a symbol 
that relates to the sensory perceived world, not an internal mathematical object.
The relation between mathematics and objectivity has been addressed from several 
points of view in the past. For example: the objectivity of mathematics (post-Hilbert), the 
objectivity of statistical models (Rasch 1968), or the problem of meaning and objectivity 
(Hill and Haddock 2000). None of the points of view which we are aware of attempts to 
formalise objectivity in mathematical terms.
2.2  Mathematisation of Objectivity
Consider a set E of concepts/magnitudes and a set A of arbitrary decisions, necessary for 
its representation. Let Ra(e) be a representation of the concept e ∈ E depending on the 
arbitrary decision a ∈ A and let F be a “natural law” expressed as F(Ra(e)) = 0 . For exam-
ple, if the concept e is “distance”, Ra(e) is the real number giving the distance according 
to a and the “natural law” is some mathematical expression involving this number, such as 
Ra(e) − C = 0 if the natural law expresses that this distance has the constant value C.
Definition 1 (Objectivity) A law is objective if F(Ra(e)) = 0 holds for any a ∈ A.
Consider an invertible transformation Tab that maps a representation Ra onto another 
representation Rb ( Tab◦Tba = Id ). By NAP, Definition 1 can be restated as:
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The transformations Tab form a group3 T. We assume that:
a) Tab◦Tbc = Tac , there exists a composition law.
b) Taa = Id , there exists an identity.
c) Tab = (Tba)−1 or (Tba◦Tab) = Id , an inverse exists.
d) Tab◦(Tbc◦Tcd) = (Tab◦Tbc)◦Tcd , the composition law is associative.
As a consequence, Tab◦(Tbc◦Tca) = Id = (Tab◦Tbc)◦Tca and Tab◦(Tbc◦Tcd) = Tab◦Tbd =
T
ad
= T
ac
◦T
cd
= (T
ab
◦T
bc
)◦T
cd
.
3  Space, Time and Observers
The system of concepts that allows the organisation of reality is dialectical, with multiple 
concepts coming into existence at once. Certain concepts in this system are meaningful 
only in relation to other concepts introduced simultaneously. In all dialectical construc-
tions, the tension of the opposites is the engine of understanding, but the terms in opposi-
tion present no difference between them other than being just the terms of the opposition. 
Hegel’s dialectic of being and not-being is perhaps the clearest example of this construc-
tive procedure (Hegel 2001). In our case, the concepts: ego, alter, identity, object, space 
and time are the fundamental building blocks for the construction of understanding; they 
cannot be referred to previous concepts because understanding can only be referred to its 
opposite: not-understanding. Thus, any attempt at defining these terms will never be com-
pletely satisfactory since we will have to resort to some complicity from the intuitions of 
the reader. We call this process dialectical openings to understanding.4 In practical terms, 
when we mention a concept (in this section) using a word that is defined later in the text, 
(2.1)F(Ra(e)) = 0⇔ F(TbaRa(e)) = F(Rb(e)) = 0.
4 In our daily quest to understand nature we make use of ideas and concepts previously produced by our 
society that we have naturalised (included in Nature although they belong to our cultural baggage). How-
ever, the recursion to previous understanding has an end and it is not always possible. When we arrive to 
such a dead end while exercising the critical reason in the search for the fundamentals we have exhausted 
the possibilities of analysis, the limits of Analytical science (Hegel 2001, par. 1720–1764). Hegel states 
“Synthetic cognition aims at the comprehension of what is, that is, at grasping the multiplicity of deter-
minations in their unity. It is therefore the second premise of the syllogism in which the diverse as such is 
related”. “Synthetic cognition” is presented by Hegel in contradistinction to “Analytic cognition”. (Kant 
1787) considered time an a-priori of knowledge, and it is certainly an a-priori for the adult as well as space 
is. Piaget taught us that the genesis of the notions of space and time is found in the early childhood (Piaget 
1999). Accounting for this philosophical tradition, we call dialectical openings to knowledge the dialectical 
constructions that set up the basic elements for the knowledge of Nature, such as time, space and object. In 
such a way, we emphasize their synthetic origin.
3 We notice that in a structural realist work (Delhôtel 2017) has considered the restricted case of trans-
formations concerning space–time following the relativistic tradition born out of Poincaré’s principle. He 
identifies “a major item on the structural realist agenda: being able to demonstrate that structural features 
are precisely and only those that are preserved across theory change, in one fashion or another, exactly or 
approximately” and later identifying “equivalence principles” as one of such structures. What we discuss 
here is stronger and deeper, because we account for the reasons why equivalence structures are required 
in a more general setting than Poincaré’s Relativity Principle (that will be briefly and critically discussed 
below). The structure identified in Delhôtel (2017) is a particular case of the mathematisation of NAP pre-
sented here. The requirement of having a group of transformations connecting descriptions differing in arbi-
trary choices is recognised in Delhôtel (2017, sec. 3) not as a requisite of reasoning but only as a conse-
quence of the postulates of the dynamics.
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it should be understood in its intuitive form, later to be formalised in a compatible form. 
We can identify the dialectical pairs ego-alter and change-permanence (time-identity). As 
for space, considering that it implies the concept of distance and with it the idea of what is 
within reach and what belongs to our world but cannot be reached without effort, it is the 
result of the dialectic near me (reachable) and at a distance (not reachable, i.e., not near 
me). Notice that the notion of oppositions as first principles is a subject already considered 
in Aristotle’s Physics (1994–2010), also referring to previous philosophers.
Notation 1 In this section we will try as much as possible to use superindices a, b to indi-
cate subjective (i.e., depending on arbitrary decisions) concepts, quantities, etc., while 
related objective entities will have no superindex.
3.1  Space and Time
3.1.1  Space
Space is spontaneously conceived by children along the construction of reality (Piaget 1999). 
It is not possible to speak separately of object, space, time and ego, because the construction 
produces all of them as a single dialectic system (we could try to straighten this matter up philo-
sophically, although this would not be loyal to the child’s structuring of thought). By exercising 
our memory we perceive some degree of permanence of ourselves, ego, and thus an idea of 
identity. The real world acquires continuity, we do not longer watch the movie frame by frame. 
Together with the recognition of ourselves comes alter, i.e., not-ego, and with the help of our 
memory some sort of permanency of alter emerges as well, the object that later, stripped of all 
other characteristics will be the “body” referenced in physics. Therefore, objects, people and 
other things acquire some sort of identity, inasmuch as we remove some attributes of them, 
mainly positions in space. Then, if an object (or ourselves) is in a place in one movie-frame 
and in a different place in another movie-frame, we no longer say they are different objects but 
rather that there was a change in the positions as well as some permanence: the object itself. 
The sequence of changes in places is the primary idea of time. Much later the child will con-
ceive herself as being of the same condition than family, pets and toys, this is, she will place 
herself in the space. Space, with its implication of distance (a concept that is easy to root in 
sensorymotive intelligence) is opposed to the unity of the cosmos of the child.
The perceived space–time, centered in the observer (ego) always has ego distinguishing 
a reference point. This primary, subjective, notion of space is compatible with an empty 
space, a holder of objects, an idea that in physics goes back, at least, to Newton. Emptiness 
is in fact a resource for the subsequent suppression of the observer. By NAP, the required 
objectivity of the laws of physics manifests in that no law is objective if it depends on ego. 
The mathematisation of this idea is expressed by Eq. (2.1), where the group T corresponds 
to spatial translations and rotations.
Axiom 1 A set of three orthogonal directions in the real (sensible) space is selected and 
represented by the symbols 퐞i . Any objective position is then represented by xAB =
∑
i xi퐞i 
with xi real numbers.
Objective space is hence built following Descartes and is represented as a vector space. 
Any other choice of reference vectors can be related to the initial one by a linear 
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transformation, 퐞�
j
=
∑
i Rji퐞i . It follows that 
∑
j x
�
j
퐞
�
j
=
∑
i xi퐞i for any objective position, 
hence x�
j
=
∑
i
�
R−1
�
ij
xi . The observer can then select a reference point and three independ-
ent orientations to describe the position of objects in the world, yet leaving the distance as 
objective. The class of equivalence thus generated is described by the group IO(3), the 
group of isometries (translations, rotations and reflections).
Subjective space, being empty, provides no way of distinguishing one direction from another 
or one reference point from another. As a consequence of NAP, subjective space is then iso-
tropic and homogeneous. We notice that objective space bears some relation to Leibniz’ rela-
tional space, while subjective space is related to Newton’s relative space (Ballard 1960).
We recall that Axioms correspond to intuitions based upon experience, the Cartesian 
space agrees with the experience of the child and of the scientist in Newton times. Further-
more, the analytical properties of e.g., Riemannian spaces are based upon differentiable 
manifolds which in turn rest upon collections of local charts of Cartesian type, a fact that 
speaks loudly about which one is the intuitive space.
3.1.2  Time
Unlike space, time is undoubtedly related to changes, sequences of changes, rapidity and 
causal relations (Piaget 1999). This is the genetic episteme of time; to call “time” any other 
kind of object is simply to ask for confusion5
5 Piaget arrived to his view about the genesis of the concept of time after a series of experiments. The 
experiments are conveniently collected in (Piaget 1978). The notion of speed, at least in the form of faster 
and slower, precedes the notion of time: “From the point of view of immediate experience, the child suc-
ceeds very soon in estimating speeds of which he has direct awareness, the spaces traversed in an identical 
time or the “before” and “after” in arrival at a goal in cases of trajectories of the same length. But there is 
a considerable gap between this and a dissociation of the notion of speed to extract a measurement of time, 
for this would involve replacing the direct intuitions peculiar to the elementary accommodation of thought 
to things by a system of relations involving a constructive assimilation.” (Piaget 1999,  p. 383). Aristotle 
relates changes in position, velocity and time. In modern notation we could write (for finite v > 0)
We can move back to the perception of the child by making v constant. Thus, change in position offers a 
clock, and since space is assumed to be continuous, so is time (an old reasoning already present in Aristo-
tle). As long as the moon revolves around the Earth, we have change and we have time. No interval of time 
will ever be empty of changes. Other points of view regarding time have been put forward and continue to 
exist. For example, time has been conceived geometrically as well, taking such character in Special Relativ-
ity. Under the geometrical conception McTaggart has even argued that time is unreal (McTaggart 1908). 
The incompatibility of the perceived time with the time of Relativity resulting from Gödel work (1949) 
was discussed and asserted by Bell (2002). Here, a distinction has to be made. On one hand Piaget’s view 
seeks the genesis of time (and the way we consider time in our daily facts) in the phenomena and its appre-
hension as idea. On the other hand, there are instrumental beliefs whose roots are nurtured by the mud of 
speculative material entities such as the œther and the electrical fluid veiled to us by mathematical axi-
oms. The different ideas revolving around the notion of time might originate in overlooked assumptions of 
the idealisation method: when we proceed through successive idealisations, the order among them matters. 
Dynamical instabilities and irreversibility (entropy) are the result of first considering the limit of sufficiently 
long times and subsequently(if needed) the limit of infinite measurement precision (Arnold and Avez 1968). 
Deterministic, time-reversible dynamics rests on taking these limits in reverse order. The school of Brussels 
showed that, for some systems, irreversibility and time-reversal possibilities respond to different choices of 
representation (Goldstein et al. 1981) connected by transformation groups. The truth is that we have access 
to finite precision and finite time lapses, while the rest is only part of the processes of ideation. The arbi-
trariness that NAP tries to remove may take subtle and unexpected shapes.
t − t
A
= ∫
x
x
A
v ⋅ dx|v|2 = ∫
x
x
A
|dx||v| .
A Constructivist View of Newton’s Mechanics 
1 3
Time is the word we use to express our perception of change; it is change in its most 
abstract form. Aristotle indicates “without change there is no time” (1994–2010, Book IV, 
Ch. 11).
The perception of change we use to construct our intuition of time rests on natural pro-
cesses. An invariant characteristic of our perception of Nature is that experienced processes 
have beginning and end. (Husserl 1983, Matter of fact) states “The founding cognitional 
act of experiencing posit something real individually; they posit it as something factually 
existing spatio-temporally, as something that is at this temporal locus, that has this duration 
of its own and a reality content which, with respect to its essence, could just as well have 
been at any other temporal locus.”
Time is a verbalisation of the dialectical tension of the pair being/not-being. In prin-
ciple, time is associated to objects (or measured) by the order of the sequence of changes 
(between sundown and sunrise the rooster sings, and if the rooster wakes me up every 
morning, it sings before—or rather while—I wake up, because this song is (part of) the 
cause of my awakening). Piaget (1999, Ch. 4) discusses the development of the notion of 
time in the child beginning from “As early as his reflex activity and the formation of his 
first habits, the nursling shows himself capable of two operations which concern the elabo-
ration of the temporal series. In the first place, he knows how to coordinate his movements 
in time and to perform certain acts before others in regular order. For instance, he knows 
how to open his mouth and seek contact before sucking, how to steer his hand to his mouth 
and even his mouth to his thumb before putting the thumb between his lips, etc.” The child 
proceeds (always according to Piaget) in five stages to develop his notion of time, always 
based on series. Starting at the third stage memory plays an increasingly relevant role.
One striking difference between time and space from the psychogenetic point of view 
is that while for the change of position in space of an object there is a possible opera-
tion that reverts the change, there is no operation capable to revert the temporal order of 
events. Unlike distance, that reaches us as a perception resulting from the telemetry of 
our binocular sight, time does not reach us as a perception, but it is rather the result of 
memory, a log of changes and a logical process that discriminates between the relative 
order of events. It follows that time is measured by comparing sequences of changes. 
By NAP, any transformation relating time-perceptions of different references (egos) is 
constrained to preserve this ordering. Therefore, while arbitrary individual subjective 
time may differ among observers, they are all related by strictly monotonic (bijective) 
mappings. The underlying group is the set of strictly increasing continuous functions 
f ∶ R↦ R with standard composition of functions as the group product.
Axiom 2 The order between the events (the various determinants and effects) involved in a 
causative relation is fixed.
This axiom relates to the concept of “determinism” discussed around Equation (A) 
in Russell (1912–1913, p. 199). In simpler words, first the vase falls, then it breaks. It 
is a vase as long as there exists a particular cohesion in the material. The alteration pro-
duced by the impact reorders the material in smaller pieces. Hence, without fall there is 
no impact, without impact no change in material stress. Causes here are gravitation and 
the change in material stress. Determinants are fall and impact, while breakup (rupture) 
is an effect.
When we measure the times of a phenomenon, say the change in position of a body, 
we use changes not involved in the process as references for time. Indeed, we resort to 
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the idealised and imagined order of all events of the universe, encompassing all possible 
changes, leaving no “room” between them since a time without changes is a contradic-
tion in the terms.6 In mathematical terms, time is well represented by a one dimensional 
mathematical space such as the real numbers, a notion that we have been using and 
will continue to use, along this work. Time-intervals are referred to this “background” 
of events that are present irrespective of the phenomenon in study. This background of 
changes constitutes a clock. We try to use as clocks those devices or observations that 
appear to us as regular. As long as we cannot present evidence that a process runs faster 
in one circumstance or another, we expect the relative order between changes in the 
clock and changes in the phenomena to remain the same, hence
Assumption 1 An objective time can be defined by convening on a process to define a 
time-unit.
Absolute time, a time encompassing all changes, appears to us in the same manner 
in which ego, alter, object and space emerge in the development of the child to produce 
a useful organisation of the world. The laws of physics and absolute time emerge in the 
construction of physics at the same step as a consequence of the same class of dialec-
tic opening that creates the terms of an opposition that produces understanding. In this 
case, system-environment (not system) implies absolute time.
Definition 2 (Events) An event is a change in the sensible world that occurs in a relatively 
short interval of time and as such is idealised as instantaneous. We remove from the event 
the determinations of time and space, which are thought of as its circumstances. Thus, 
events occur at a given location and a given time.
3.2  Observers
The observer (ego) describes the world by measuring all distances with respect to a 
point of her/his election. We use the notation xa
A
 for the position of body A as measured 
by observer a. When facing the need of relating positions of different observed bodies, 
conforming to NAP and the search for an objective description of physical entities, we 
define:
Definition 3 (relative position): We call xAB = xaA − xaB the relative position between 
observed bodies A and B, as seen from the ego a at a given moment.
Corollary 1 It is a demand of objectivity (by NAP) that xa
A
− xa
B
= xb
A
− xb
B
 (hence, there is 
no superindex in xAB).
6 If time is conceived as holding a series of events, we may ask whether it is possible to have a time inter-
val without changes or events (since each event represents a change). During a time without changes there 
would be no heart-beats of the observer, no movement of any object in the universe, no change that could 
be used as clock, etc. Between the two encompassing events of time without change there would be no 
way to measure time since measuring it requires something that changes. We would have then proposed 
that measurable (sensible) time differs from “true time” by an unaccountable amount, yet all observers will 
measure zero time identically since it is a property of monotonic functions to map open intervals into open 
intervals. Hence, a time interval without changes contradicts the early determination of time as associated 
to movement (change of position in space) and being therefore continuous.
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In a sense related to Leibniz, objective space is relational. Indeed, one may sus-
pect that vector spaces have been constructed to this end. The group relating the arbi-
trary choices of different observers is IO(3), the semi-direct product of isometries and 
translations.
In the sequel, we will call subjective the space created by an arbitrary choice of refer-
ence point and base vectors orientations.
Definition 4 Relative velocity is the rate of change of relative position between two bodies 
with respect to the change in time,
3.3  Subjective Velocity and Galileo Transformations
The relative velocity between the reference point chosen by the observer a and a body 
A, follows Definition 4,
We now focus on the subjective operation consisting in setting xa
a
(t + Δt) − xa
a
(t) = 0a 
and similarly va
a
= limΔt→0
xa
a
(t+Δt)−xa
a
(t)
Δt
= 0a , this is to say that for the observer, the point 
designated as reference by her/his arbitrary decision does not move (we have added the 
superscript a to the zero to indicate the subjectivity). Now the relative velocity reads
where we call va
A
 the subjective velocity of A as established by observer a.
Proposition 1 The Galilean transformation between observers (reference points) a and b 
is given by,
It is an operation that belongs to the group associated by NAP to the concept of subjec-
tive velocity.
Proof We begin by writing the equality
which after a rearrangement reads
Next we observe that
with xba an objective relative distance. We then have
vAB =
d(xa
A
− xa
B
)
dt
= lim
Δt→0
(
xa
A
(t + Δt) − xa
B
(t + Δt)
)
−
(
xa
A
(t) − xa
B
(t)
)
Δt
.
vAa =
d(xa
A
− xa
a
)
dt
= lim
Δt→0
(
xa
A
(t + Δt) − xa
a
(t + Δt)
)
−
(
xa
A
(t) − xa
a
(t)
)
Δt
.
vAa =
d(xa
A
− xa
a
)
dt
= lim
Δt→0
xa
A
(t + Δt) − xa
A
(t)
Δt
− 0a ≡ va
A
− 0a,
va
A
= vb
A
+ vba.
xa
A
(t + dt) − xa
A
(t) −
(
xa
a
(t + dt) − xa
a
(t)
)
= xb
A
(t + dt) − xb
A
(t) −
(
xb
a
(t + dt) − xb
a
(t)
)
,
(xa
A
(t + dt) − xa
A
(t)) − 0a = (xb
A
(t + dt) − xb
A
(t)) − 0b + 0b −
(
xb
a
(t + dt) − xb
a
(t)
)
.
0b − (xb
a
(t + dt) − xb
a
(t)) = (xb
b
(t + dt) − xb
a
(t + dt)) − (xb
b
(t) − xb
a
(t)) = xba(t + dt) − xba(t),
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Dropping the zeroes, dividing by dt and taking the limit dt → 0 , we obtain the Galilean 
transformation between observers. We further notice that the limit is not a necessary step. 
 □
Lemma 1 Galilean transformations form a group having vector addition as internal 
operation.
Proof Repeated use of Proposition 1 gives,
  □
4  The Law of Inertia
4.1  Laws of Nature
The meaning of laws of Nature deserves some examination. In western culture before the 
Enlightenment, it remitted us to God’s blueprints for the universe as in the early times of 
Descartes, Newton and Leibniz. After the Enlightenment, the laws of Nature must rest on rea-
son (Kant 1783, 1798). The question ‘What is a law of Nature?’ has been extensively debated 
in contemporary philosophy of science. Here we will not focus on what makes a statement to 
be a natural law. Nevertheless, no matter how that question is answered, certain general fea-
tures of laws can be recognised. The laws of Nature correspond to fundamental relations in sit-
uations in which a small (minimal) portion of the universe, the system, is considered (through 
a process of idealisation) as isolated from its environment, i.e., the complement in the Uni-
verse of the ideally-isolated system. Such a notion implies that the internal organisation of the 
system—which the law will make explicit—, must be independent of the environment since 
this is the nature of the concept we are seeking. Hence, the law must hold with independence 
of the relative location of the system with respect to the environment and shall not be affected 
by the background of changes. In our perspective, there are no laws of Nature but rather laws 
for the understanding of Nature, which themselves are subject to the laws of reasoning and 
include in their ontogeny both experience and usefulness: the object and the subject.
4.2  The Law of Inertia
Definition 5 An isolated body is an idealisation consisting in extrapolating the (short-
time) motion of bodies that are perceived to be not interacting with other bodies.
This perception could originate in the fact that when the distance between bodies is suf-
ficiently large or the time of the observation is sufficiently short, interactions do not show 
any appreciable effect (i.e., it is an idealisation).
(xa
A
(t + dt) − xa
A
(t)) − 0a = (xb
A
(t + dt) − xb
A
(t)) + (xab(t + dt) − xab(t)) − 0
b.
va
A
=vb
A
+ vba
=
(
vc
A
+ vcb
)
+ vba
=vc
A
+
(
vcb + vba
)
= vc
A
+ vca.
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An isolated body can be regarded as being alone in the universe. As such, it defines by itself 
a privileged place and reference point. However, when we deal with several ideally isolated 
bodies, we must consider the problem of their changing (relative) distances (which is a result 
of the same idealising process). By NAP, the description given from the perspective of an 
isolated body must be equivalent to the description given by any other isolated body inas-
much as the particularity of the description is only that the observer is isolated (i.e., not influ-
enced in its motion by other bodies). The condition of a body as isolated is a condition of per-
manence, hence, when compared with time (the measure of change) it has to be represented 
by a zero derivative of its state. Therefore, we define,
Definition 6 Inertial set is the collection of isolated bodies. The inertial class of observers 
consists of those observers that use an element of the inertial set as point of reference.
When seeking a fundamental law for isolated bodies we must consider first the possibility 
of giving them fixed relative positions, but such a law contradicts our current perceptions (we 
recall that in the Aristotelian physics the motion of bodies required causes, i.e., “forces”).
Assumption 2 There exist at least two isolated bodies that are not at rest relative to each 
other.
The next possibility to be considered is:
Lemma 2 Isolated bodies move with constant relative velocity.
Proof Consider the law of motion of an isolated body, A, as described by an observer a in 
the inertial class. By Assumption 2 the law of motion cannot be d
dt
xAa = 0 . The most gen-
eral law of second order is
However, the law must be the same for all times since there is no privileged time, 
훼(xAa, vAa, t) = 훼(xAa, vAa, 0) . Additionally, by NAP, a second observer that has selected its 
reference position at a fixed distance from a must produce the same law. It follows that the 
law cannot depend on xAa and by the same reasoning an observer that moves with constant 
relative speed with respect to a must observe the same law, hence 훼(xAa, vAa, t) = Υ , being 
Υ a constant vector. However, such constant would indicate a particular direction in space 
unless Υ = 0 . Hence, we arrive to the expression
that satisfies the established requisite of permanency.  □
Corollary 2 An inertial observer (i.e., an element of the inertial class) is one in which only 
interactions are associated to changes in the velocities.
Proof The result is just Lemma 2 in negative form.  □
d2
dt2
xAa = 훼(xAa, vAa, t).
(4.1)d
2
dt2
xAa = 0,
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Theorem 1 Galilean transformations belong to the group of transformations mapping the 
position determinations of one inertial observer to those of another one.
Proof By Corollary 2 and Lemma 2 two inertial observers behave as two isolated bodies 
with constant (objective) relative velocity. The subjective velocities determined by each 
system are related via Proposition 1.  □
It is important to notice that Lemma 2 has an equivalent statement in terms of subjec-
tive space and time. The proof is based on the homogeneous and isotropic character of the 
subjective space.
Notice that the inertial observer is a resource of the subjective point of view, since the 
objective presentation focuses only in relations. In terms of the objective presentation if two 
bodies present a relative velocity that changes with time, then both of them cannot belong in 
the inertial class, i.e., at least one of them must be in interaction with something else. It can-
not be ruled out that both of them interact and none is in the inertial class. Hence we have,
Corollary 3 The relative acceleration 훼BA , of the body B with respect to an isolated body, 
A, depends only on the relative positions and velocities of the interacting material bodies. 
훼BA ≡ 훼BA(xBC, vBC; interaction attributes ) , where C is some other body in interaction with 
B.
5  Interacting Bodies
We have shown that the only law of motion compatible with isolated bodies is the law of 
inertia. It is time to consider bodies with interactions. The same law in its negative form 
is: accelerations (i.e., changes in the instantaneous velocity) are the result of interactions 
between bodies. The simplest form of interaction to be considered involves just two mate-
rial bodies. Consider an observer in the inertial class (hence, it does not interact with the 
bodies under consideration). From its perspective, if bodies A and B do not follow the iner-
tial law, they must be interacting, hence the minimal setup for non-inertial motion requires 
two bodies that are described by the inertial (isolated) observer, which establishes the fol-
lowing relations:
where 훼AB is the (objective) relative acceleration of body A with respect to body B.
Assumption 3 Accelerations are additive i.e., for any inertial observer a, the acceleration 
produced onto a material body (A) jointly by bodies (B) and (C), given that B and C do not 
influence each other, satisfies 훼a
A
(B,C) = 훼a
A
(B) + 훼a
A
(C) , i.e., it is the sum of the accelera-
tions produced by individual interactions of A with (B) and with (C).
(5.1)
d
dt
va
A
= 훼a
A
d
dt
va
B
= 훼a
B
d
dt
(va
A
− va
B
) =
d
dt
vAB = 훼AB,
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Following Newton,
Assumption 4 We consider in the sequel interactions of instantaneous action at a distance.
Other types of interactions may be imagined, but we are focusing on Newton’s pro-
gramme. This assumption was suggested by observation. For gravitation, it has so far 
resisted refutation. Indeed, several experimental measurements indicate that in classical 
terms the “speed of gravity” must be larger than 108C (being C the speed of light), the first 
argument going back to Laplace (Van Flandern 1998).
5.1  Gravitation and Mass
The fundamental interaction between two bodies, the one that is always present and cannot 
be compensated, is called gravitation of matter. A fundamental ingredient at this point is 
Galileo’s proof that all bodies experience the same acceleration in vertical motion (Galilei 
1914, Third day, p. 173–). This achievement rests both on the logical need of investigating 
accelerated bodies after inquiring about non-accelerated bodies (Eq. 4.1) and on experi-
mental observation.
Assumption 5 The gravitational acceleration 훼a
A
(B) produced onto a material body (A) by 
a given one (B) is proportional to a characteristic of the body B named the mass (all other 
circumstances being identical). The mass of body B is an objective property (i.e., the same, 
up to choice of units, for any inertial observer).
In mathematical terms, the accelerations are, letting ga
A
(B) summarise the rest of the 
dependencies,
Corollary 4 The mass of an aggregation of matter is the aggregated mass of the parts.
Notation 2 From here on, we will drop the index of ego, since we are dealing with just one 
observer belonging to the inertial class. For example, we write 훼A ≡ 훼aA . However, quanti-
ties with two “body”-subindices, such as fAB are always objective.7
Assumption 6 The gravitational interaction depends only on relative position.
With this we mean that letting xAB = xA − xB , then gA(B) = xAB휙 , where 휙 is a sca-
lar function that may depend on the length of the vector xAB . When considering the 
훼a
A
(B) = mBg
a
A
(B)
훼a
B
(A) = mAg
a
B
(A).
7 Binkoski (2016) argues that with three relational hypotheses it is possible to distinguish inertial systems 
from non inertial, while “Galilean relational space–time is too weak of a structure to support a relational 
interpretation of classical mechanics.” At this point of our formulation it is clear that Newtonian mechanics 
considers an (external) observer, something what is necessarily non-relational. In more general terms, the 
dialectic objective–subjective (attaining objectivity by negating, going across, subjectivity) that we have 
presented solves the apparent opposition between Newton and Leibniz. This solution is reached by means 
of a critical reflection, not by adding ad-hoc postulates aiming to obtain some desired relation (what would 
amount to resort to instrumental reason).
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gravitational interaction of two bodies, A, localised in xA and, B, localised in xB accord-
ing to an inertial observer, we notice that exchanging attributes between bodies is the 
same as exchanging positions, hence an immediate corollary of this assumption is that 
gA(B) = −gB(A) . As a consequence, to render this symmetry explicit rather than accelera-
tion it is convenient to consider
Definition 7 FAB = mA훼A(B) = mAmBgA(B) is called gravitational force.
A related quantity is
Definition 8 The linear momentum of a material body is the product of its mass times its 
velocity p = mv.
Thus, the gravitational interaction is described by the symmetric form
the latter being a definition of the concept of gravitational force and of force, the cause for 
the changes in momentum.
Corollary 5 The total momentum pA + pB is constant in time when the bodies interact grav-
itationally, i.e.,
The previous corollary is an immediate consequence of Assumption 6, i.e., of 
gA(B) = −gB(A) . In Classical Mechanics it is called Newton’s third law and also Principle 
of Action and Reaction.
5.2  Other Interactions
Let us now consider other interactions following the previous Newtonian scheme. Assump-
tions 5 and 6 are too narrow to encompass other types of interactions, despite its adequacy 
for gravitation. We rephrase them in a more general setting as
Assumption 5′ The defining property Qi is additive for f, i.e.,
Here Qi denotes the defining property of body i associated to the interaction, i.e., the 
necessary information in order to determine the interaction, and f is the associated force, 
i.e., a quantity representing the departure of bodies A and B from inertial motion. For 
example, Q stands for electric charge and f for the Coulomb electrostatic force (see the final 
paragraph of Sect. 5.4 for further discussion).
d
dt
pA = mA
d
dt
vA = mA훼A(B) ≡ FAB = mAmBgA(B)
d
dt
pB = mB
d
dt
vB = mB훼B(A) ≡ FBA = mBmAgB(A),
d
dt
(
pA + pB
)
=
d
dt
pA +
d
dt
pB = mAmBgA(B) + mBmAgB(A) = 0.
f (Q1 + Q2, xA,… ,QB, xB,…) = f (Q1, xA,… ,QB, xB,…) + f (Q2, xA,… ,QB, xB,…).
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Assumption 6′ We consider in the sequel interactions that depend only on relative posi-
tion and relative velocity.
Newtonian mechanics is based on the generalisation of Definition 7 to other types of 
interactions, namely
Assumption 7 Force f is the cause of acceleration. The latter is proportional to the ratio 
between force and mass.
We have already realised that a consequence of Lemma 2 is that the presence of accel-
erations is an indication (or a symptom) of the existence of interactions. This assumption 
states that the totality of the intervening interactions is exhausted in the acceleration, they 
are its cause. We should notice that this assumption must be contrasted with experiments.8 
Hence, we write,
In this presentation there is no need to introduce inertial mass as something different 
from gravitatory mass. Gravitation is taken to be a fundamental (unavoidable) interaction 
and its associated mass is what enters in Eqs. (5.2 and 5.3). This is a consequence of the 
symmetry of the presentation, by which whatever pertains the gravitational interaction is 
explicitly displayed.
5.2.1  Consequences
The above symmetry considerations may be propounded for Eqs.  (5.2 and  5.3). In fact, 
f (QA, xA,… ,QB, xB,…) is the force that the body with property QB and geometrical 
parameters xB,… exerts on the body with property QA (and xA,… ). The dots indicate that 
forces may depend on other geometrical properties than just position (velocity, for exam-
ple). The quantity k(QA, xA,… ,QB, xB,…) is the corresponding force that A exerts on B. It 
follows by NAP that
Lemma 3 Under the previous assumptions, for a pair of bodies A and B in interaction, the 
forces f (force on A caused by B) and k (force on B caused by A) satisfy the Generalised 
Principle of Action and Reaction, namely
(5.2)mA
d2
dt2
xA = f (QA, xA,… ,QB, xB,…)
(5.3)mB
d2
dt2
xB = k(QA, xA,… ,QB, xB,…).
(5.4)k(QA, xA,… ,QB, xB,…) = f (QB, xB,… ,QA, xA,…).
f = xAB𝜙e + vAB𝜙s +
(
xAB × vAB
)
𝜙⊥
k = − xAB𝜙e − vAB𝜙s +
(
xAB × vAB
)
𝜙⊥,
8 For example, Weber’s formalisation of Faraday’s induction law (Weber 1846) requires for the induction 
(electromotive) force to depend on the acceleration (as Faraday’s law also does). This may be interpreted as 
having a mass that depends on the relative state of motion of the interacting charges.
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where 𝜙e,𝜙s,𝜙⊥ are scalar functions of relative position, relative velocity and possibly 
other parameters, xAB = xA − xB and vAB = vA − vB.
Proof By Assumption 6′ there is no other geometric dependency and we can replace 
the occurrences of xA, xB by xAB and those of vA, vB by vAB . Let T denote the operation of 
exchanging the geometrical properties associated to bodies A and B (or, what is the same, 
switching their defining properties Qi ). We have, by NAP,
and consequently T2 = Id . The most general expression for a force between two interacting 
bodies depending as vector only on the vectors xAB and vAB is
where the multiplicative factors 𝜙e,𝜙s,𝜙⊥,𝜓e,𝜓s,𝜓⊥ are scalar functions of relative posi-
tion, relative velocity and possibly other parameters. The reason is that relative position and 
relative velocity define only three vectors in space. In other words, 휙e , etc., may depend on 
various properties (charge, velocity, etc.) but are scalar coefficients. The vector property of 
f and k is given by linear combinations of xAB , vAB and xAB × vAB . We recall that the vector 
w × z (called cross product or vector product of w and z) has a direction that is perpendicu-
lar to both w and z and whenever w and z are collinear, w × z = 0.
Exchanging the properties Q1 and Q2 of A and B is equivalent to keeping the properties 
and exchanging their masses, positions and velocities. Again by NAP, from Eqs. (5.4 and 
5.5) we have,
which produces
  □
Remark 1 Gravitation, as conceived by Newton, has vanishing 휙s and 𝜙⊥.
Lemma 4 Under the Generalized Principle of Action and Reaction the total momentum, 
pA + pB , is constant in time if and only if 휙⟂ = 0.
(5.5)
Tf (Q1,Q2, xAB, vAB,… , t) = f (Q2,Q1, xAB, vAB,… , t)
= k(Q1,Q2,−xAB,−vAB,… , t)
Tk(Q1,Q2,−xAB,−vAB,… , t) = k(Q2,Q1,−xAB,−vAB,… , t)
= f (Q1,Q2, xAB, vAB,… , t)
f (Q1,Q2, xAB, vAB, t) = xAB𝜙e + vAB𝜙s +
(
xAB × vAB
)
𝜙⊥
k(Q1,Q2, xAB, vAB, t) = xAB𝜓e + vAB𝜓s +
(
xAB × vAB
)
𝜓⊥,
(5.6)
f (Q1,Q2, xAB, vAB, t) = xAB𝜙e + vAB𝜙s +
(
xAB × vAB
)
𝜙⊥
= −xAB𝜓e − vAB𝜓s +
((
−xAB
)
×
(
−vAB
))
𝜓⊥
= −xAB𝜓e − vAB𝜓s +
(
xAB × vAB
)
𝜓⊥,
(5.7)휙e = −휓e, 휙s = −휓s, 휙⟂ = 휓⟂.
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Proof We just compute
Moreover, if (x − y) is parallel to (u − v) (unidimensional relative motion) the actual 
value of 휙
⟂
 is irrelevant and we can choose to set 휙
⟂
= 0 also in that situation.  □
We must notice that the total momentum as perceived by the observer is a conserved quan-
tity if and only if 휙
⟂
= 0 for all forces in classical mechanics. The idea of conservation of total 
momentum is a consequence of Newtonian tradition and not a demand of reason. It must be 
established in every new theory of Nature as an additional assumption subject to empirical 
consideration.
Lemma 5 Under the Generalized Principle of Action and Reaction there is no internal 
torque if and only if 휙s = 휙⟂ = 0.
Proof Following Corollary 4, we compute, recalling that d
dt
vAB = 훼AB =
f
mA
−
k
mB
,
The dependence on 휙e vanishes by the properties of the cross product. Since the remain-
ing terms in the rhs have contributions in different directions,
In Classical Mechanics the quantity in square brackets is called angular momentum and 
its time-derivative is called torque.   □
5.3  Central Forces
An important issue in Classical Mechanics following the Newtonian tradition is that of central 
forces depending only on the relative distance. From the previous results, the following par-
ticular case can be highlighted:
d
dt
(
pA + pB
)
= f + k
= xAB(𝜙e − 𝜙e) + vAB(𝜙s − 𝜙s)
+
(
xAB × vAB
)
(𝜙⊥ + 𝜙⊥)
= 2
(
xAB × vAB
)
𝜙⊥.
xAB ×
mAmB
mA + mB
d
dt
vAB = xAB ×
mAmB
mA + mB
(
f
mA
−
k
mB
)
= xAB ×
(
xAB𝜙e + vAB𝜙s
)
+
(
mB − mA
mA + mB
)
xAB ×
(
xAB × vAB
)
𝜙⊥.
d
dt
[
xAB ×
mAmB
mA + mB
vAB
]
= 0⇔ 휙s = 휙⟂ = 0.
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Lemma 6 Under the previous assumptions, if 휙s = 0 and 휙e = h(|xAB|) (a scalar function 
of relative distance only) then there exists a dynamical quantity (called internal energy) 
that is constant in time.
Proof A standard computation using the relative (objective) quantities defined previously 
yields,
which by Eqs. (5.6 and 5.7) reads (since vAB ⋅
(
xAB × vAB
)
= 0),
In other words, under the conditions of this Lemma, we have,
We identify in the lhs the kinetic energy for the relative motion. Let −V(|xAB|) be such 
that −∇V = h(|xAB|) xAB . Then, − dVdt = h(|xAB|) xAB ⋅ vAB and therefore
The quantity E = 1
2
mAmB
mA+mB
(
vAB
)2
+ V(|xAB|) is known in Classical Mechanics as internal 
energy.  □
5.4  The Tension Between Inertial and Non‑inertial
One of the pillars of our understanding of Nature is observation, which invariably takes 
place on Earth (or since recently on its neighbouring galactic surroundings). Both the sur-
face of the Earth and the Solar System are regarded as non-inertial references by Classical 
Mechanics. Indeed, we have no reasons to doubt of this non-inertiality since we detect its 
effects. However, since the Leibniz–Clarke discussion and lately Mach (see below) it has 
been an important issue the fact we have no means to decide whether a reference system is 
inertial (fully free from interactions) or not.
Despite this issue, physics has succeeded in conceiving different fundamental interac-
tions, such as gravitation or the electrostatic interaction as described by Coulomb. One may 
wonder how this could be done in the first place, without having a clue about “how inertial” 
we are. The solution presented here finds its support on three concepts: (a) the process of 
idealisation described by Galileo, by which one identifies and eliminates from observation 
what is conceived to be foreign to the interaction under study, e.g., the effect of friction 
forces, or the presence of other interactions influencing both the system and the observer, (b) 
a fully-objective approach where the description of an interaction is performed using objec-
tive (invariant) quantities belonging to the interaction pair (relative positions, charges and 
the like) and (c) the honest effort to keep the description free from influences coming from 
(
vAB
)
⋅
d
dt
(
vAB
) ≡ 1
2
d
dt
(
vAB
)2
=
(
vAB
)
⋅
(
f
mA
−
k
mB
)
,
1
2
d
dt
(
vAB
)2
=
(
1
mA
+
1
mB
)
vAB ⋅
(
xAB휙e + vAB휙s
)
.
1
2
mAmB
mA + mB
d
dt
(
vAB
)2
= h(|xAB|) xAB ⋅ vAB.
d
dt
(
1
2
mAmB
mA + mB
(
vAB
)2
+ V(|xAB|)
)
= 0.
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the observer to the largest possible extent (this description is always provisional until a new, 
so-far neglected, influence of the observer is detected). We return to this issue in Sect. 6.1.
It is illustrative to consider the way in which the founders of electromagnetism studied 
the new interactions, an approach based on Assumption 3. Prior to experimenting with the 
new interaction, they let the system to be at rest in the observer’s frame as a result of the 
equilibrium of the (other) present forces and accelerations. Next, the new influential condi-
tion was established and when a new equilibrium was reached they measured the balancing 
force judged to be equivalent (but opposite in sign) to the newly introduced force. Thus, 
forces are introduced as members of an equivalence class rather than by a direct application 
of the definition, i.e., no acceleration is truly measured in a first instance. Such were the 
methods of Coulomb and Ampère for example.
6  On Newton’s Laws of Classical Mechanics
Those, like us, that have tried to reach a deeper understanding of Newton’s ideas by 
reading the Principia, might have come to the conclusion that Newton left behind little 
or no clues on the fundamentals behind his axioms. In the Scholium to the Definitions 
(Newton 1687), Newton writes his famous notion of absolute space and time. Although 
he recognises them as related to the common intuition of “the vulgar” he proposes that 
the vulgar conceptions are imperfect images of absolute time and absolute space, a posi-
tion that reminds us of the precedence of Platonic worlds, being the world of ideas the 
real world (Plato 2014). Needless to say, Newton relies on the vulgar notions to deliver 
and argument for his notions of space and time, place and motion. He indeed introduces 
without explicit recognition the idea of Galilean transformations: “Thus in a ship under 
sail, the relative place of a body is that part of the ship which the body possesses, [...] 
But real, absolute rest, is the continuance of the body in the same part of that immov-
able space in which the ship itself, its cavity, and all that it contains is moved. Where-
fore if the earth is really at rest, the body which relatively rests in the ship, will really 
and absolutely move and with the same velocity which the ship has on the earth. But if 
the earth also moves the truly and absolute motion of the body will arise, partly from 
the true motion of the earth in immovable space; partly from the relative motion of the 
ship on the earth; and if the body moves also relatively in the ship; its true motion will 
arise, partly from the true motion of the earth in immovable space, and partly from the 
relative motions as well of the ship on the earth, as of the body on the ship;...” ((Motte) 
Newton 1687, p. 78) For Newton, it is relative space what can be conceived by the vul-
gar as fixed to the heavens: “All things are placed in time as to order of succession; and 
in space as to order of situation. It is from their essence or nature that they are places; 
and that the primary place of things should be movable, is absurd [...] But because the 
parts of space cannot be seen, or distinguished from one another by our senses, therefore 
in their stead we use sensible measures of them. For from the positions and distances of 
things from any body considered as immovable, we define all places; and then with 
respect to such places we estimate all motions...And so, instead of absolute places and 
motions we use relative ones, and that without any inconvenience in common affairs; 
but in philosophical disquisitions, we ought to abstract from our senses and consider 
things themselves, distinct from what are only sensible measures of them. For it may be 
that there is no body at rest to which the places and motions of others may be referred 
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((Motte) Newton 1687, p. 79) (Cajori corrected the last phrase to: “And therefore, as it 
is possible, that in the remote region of fixed stars, and perhaps far beyond them, there 
may be some body absolutely at rest...” ((Mote-Cajori) Newton 1687)).
Newton’s construction cannot come to an end unless the existence of an end, absolute 
space, is introduced ad-hoc. In terms of the present work, Newton’s construction is moving 
from the subjectivity of one reference into the subjectivity of another, each one carrying 
its relative space. The sequence of subjective views can only finish in an objective view. Is 
God the observer of absolute space? Thus, rather than fixed to the heavens, absolute space 
is fixed to the Heavens, i.e., objective space would be God’s perspective. The same sort of 
recursion is present in absolute time [see General Scholium, (Newton 1687, p. 503–)].
Concerning time, Newton did not conceive a method of measuring absolute time, but 
only approximations to the ideal time: “Absolute time, in astronomy, is distinguished 
from relative, by the equation or correction of the vulgar time. For the natural days are 
truly unequal, though they are commonly considered as equal, and used for a measure of 
time; astronomers correct this inequality for their more accurate deducing of the celestial 
motions. It may be, that there is no such thing as an equable motion, whereby time may be 
accurately measured. All motions may be accelerated and retarded; but the true, or equable, 
progress of absolute time is liable to no change.“ ((Motte) Newton 1687, p. 78)
Newton conceived absolute space and time as the limit of a process in which relative 
motions were added and clocks were perfected in their regularity. The opposite view of 
space in those years was that of Leibniz who sustained the relational view. We have shown 
in this work that both views are intimately related and that absolute space and time consist 
in a final attempt to maintain the observer in the scene. In our discussion, in contrast, sub-
jective space and motion are the result of the introduction of the idealised observer in the 
scene. Newton’s view of absolute time and space corresponds to the egocentric stage of 
the child, as observed by Piaget (1999, p. 367), later to be modified by the recognition of 
the other. It is important to notice that although relative space appears as objective, relative 
time appears only as intersubjective, being impossible for us to define an objective measure 
of time without an ad-hoc assumption, which in all cases amounts to construct a physi-
cal equivalent of our memory such as logging the tics of a clock or the oscillations of a 
pendulum.
In Principia Mathematica Newton founded the concept of mass on the intuition of 
weight: “The quantity of matter is the measure of the same, arising from its density and 
bulk conjointly [...] It is this quantity that I mean hereafter everywhere under the name of 
body or mass. And the same is known by the weight of each body; for it is proportional to 
the weight, as I have found by experiments on pendulums, very accurately made, which 
shall be shown hereafter.” ((Motte) Newton 1687) Such an idea was later challenged in an 
a-posteriori empiricist view by (Mach 1919). We have shown in this work that Newton’s 
perspective is proper to the construction of knowledge, this is, the genetic meaning of mass 
emerges from interactions. We realise that the gravitational interaction is the most notori-
ous one, and pre-exists the concept of force. In the terms of Popper, Newton’s theory is 
simpler than Mach’s proposal, since it lends itself more generously to refutation (Popper 
1959).
It is worth noting that Principia Mathematica dedicates special attention to the issue of 
relative vs. absolute rotations. A fundamental difference between rotational and transla-
tional motion is that rotations cannot be conceived without acceleration. In the Scholium to 
the first chapter Newton discusses centripetal forces: “A centripetal force is that by which 
bodies are drawn or impelled, or in any way tend, towards a point as to a centre. Of this 
sort is gravity” ((Motte) Newton 1687, p. 74) and he continues later “The effects which 
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distinguish absolute from relative motion are, the forces of receding from the axis of cir-
cular motion. For there are no such forces in a circular motion purely relative, but in a 
true and absolute circular motion, they are greater or less, according to the quantity of the 
motion” ((Motte) Newton 1687, pp. 80–81). This view contrasts with Mach’s attempts to 
wipe out the difference between relative and absolute rotations: “The principles of mechan-
ics can, indeed, be so conceived, that even for relative rotations centrifugal forces arise” 
(Mach 1919, II.VI.5, p. 232). In that paragraph Mach remains within the kinematic aspect 
of relative rotations; what we may call the visual intuition of rotation. However, in the con-
struction of knowledge, the child gradually adds other sensations to the visual, noticeably 
the physical effort required to sustain a rotation. The distinction relates to our experiences 
as children, with relative motion related to spinning around our vertical axis (while stand-
ing up) and absolute circular motion such as the one used to throw stones with a sling. 
While the visual appearance is equivalent, the complete sensorial experience is quite dif-
ferent. The sensorial difference has to be accounted for and Newton introduces the dis-
tinction between absolute and relative rotation. Mach makes an enormous metaphysical 
effort—thus betraying his own ideas—to disregard the difference in sensory effects arising 
in actual rotations as opposed to apparent ones (called in this context “relative” both by 
Newton and Mach). Poincaré (1913, Ch. VII) criticised Mach’s view accurately indicating 
that in order to confuse apparent rotations with true ones, we need to assign to the appar-
ent rotation a force which is contrary to intuition (it increases with distance), a sort of 
conspiracy of the rest of the universe to deceive the observer. Mach’s attempt to suppress 
the subject comes short of Newton’s insight about the difference between subjective and 
objective descriptions.
Poincaré (1913) insisted on this matter proposing for discussion an “Earth” always cov-
ered (clouded), so that celestial references could not be observed. The scientists of this 
“Earth” would discuss relative and absolute rotations. “In the theory of relative motion we 
observe, besides real forces, two imaginary forces, which we call ordinary centrifugal force 
and compounded centrifugal force. Our imaginary scientists can thus explain everything 
by looking upon these two forces as real, and they would not see in this a contradiction of 
the generalised principle of inertia, for these forces would depend, the one on the relative 
positions of the different parts of the system, such as real attractions, and the other on their 
relative velocities, as in the case of real frictions. Many difficulties, however, would before 
long awaken their attention. If they succeeded in realising an isolated system, the centre of 
gravity of this system would not have an approximately rectilinear path. They could invoke, 
to explain this fact, the centrifugal forces which they would regard as real, and which, no 
doubt, they would attribute to the mutual actions of the bodies-only they would not see 
these forces vanish at great distances—that is to say, in proportion as the isolation is better 
realised. Far from it. Centrifugal force increases indefinitely with distance. Already this 
difficulty would seem to them sufficiently serious, but it would not detain them for long. 
They would soon imagine some very subtle medium analogous to our ether, in which all 
bodies would be bathed, and which would exercise on them a repulsive action. But that 
is not all. Space is symmetrical-yet the laws of motion would present no symmetry. They 
should be able to distinguish between right and left. They would see, for instance, that 
cyclones always turn in the same direction, while for reasons of symmetry they should turn 
indifferently in any direction. If our scientists were able by dint of much hard work to make 
their universe perfectly symmetrical, this symmetry would not subsist, although there is 
no apparent reason why it should be disturbed in one direction more than in another. They 
would extract this from the situation no doubt they would invent something which would 
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not be more extraordinary than the glass spheres of Ptolemy...” The discussion continues 
for long, mathematising this “Earth” until reaching a contradiction.
In terms of genetic epistemology a central place is taken by cognitive surpass9 shortly 
said, it consists in a reordering of previous knowledge, extending it into more general (uni-
versal) forms. The old knowledge, however, is not suppressed. It becomes rather a particu-
lar form of the new one, a form that supports as well the new structure of knowledge. Thus, 
the distinction about rotating around our axis and that of revolving a stone with a sling 
must be preserved. As indicated by Poincaré, Mach’s posit destroys this difference. Still, 
the difference does not imply absolute space, because the latter means to conceive rotations 
with respect to something else, while for an extended body like the Earth rotations corre-
spond to the movement of one part of the Earth around another. Hence, it is possible and 
simple to forget about the stars still preserving the eidetic seeing that originated the distinc-
tion. In the relationalist point of view, it can be said as well that the stone revolves around 
us, or both revolve around the common centre of mass, but in all cases, sensible forces 
are exerted between the revolving bodies, the bodies interact. The same can be said with 
respect to (parts of) the Earth, but the heavens have nothing to do with it.
6.1  The Present View
In this essay we explore the consequences of recognising our humanity, the acceptance of 
the undeniable fact that our thoughts have their grounds in the constructions we produced 
as babies and infants, later integrated with our cultural background. This structure is built 
always under the supervision of reason, since reason protects the unity of our conception of 
the world: the construction by dialectical oppositions that we have come to call understand-
ing. Thus, the starting point of our construction is a principle of knowledge, an internal 
requirement of both what we are ready to accept as knowledge of the world and what has 
to be rejected as such. We named this principle the No Arbitrariness Principle (NAP). On 
the positive side, it enables us to pursue the quest of developing an objective knowledge of 
the world. Since knowledge means to put the input of the sensory system in correspond-
ence with the organisational labour of our brain,10 truly objective knowledge can only be 
sought by a second motion in which the subject (the observer) removes her/himself from 
9 Original in Spanish: rebasamiento cognoscitivo (Piaget and García 1989).
10 This point of view has several precedents. Kant (1787, Introduction) opens the book by saying “That 
all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of 
cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, 
and partly of themselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding into activity, 
to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impres-
sions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience?” and later “Understanding cannot intuite, and 
the sensuous faculty cannot think. In no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge 
arise”. Husserl formulates similar ideas as “Isolated experience, even when it is accumulated, is still worth 
little to it. It is in the methodical disposition and connection of experiences, in the interplay of experience 
and thought, which has its logically rigid laws, that valid experience is distinguished from invalid, that 
each experience is accorded its level of validity, and that objectively valid knowledge as such, knowledge 
of nature, is worked out” (Husserl and Lauer 1956, p. 234). Piaget and Garcia state “Not only is there an 
absence of a clear frontier between the contributions of the subject and those of the object (since we can 
only know about interactions between the two) but in addition, it is only to the extent that logical and math-
ematical structures are applied that one can come to attain the object, and objectivity improves as a func-
tion of richer logico-mathematical structures. In fact, the elementary perceptual object is already partially 
’logicized’ from the start, even though much less ’objective’ than the more elaborated object.” (Piaget and 
García 1989, Introduction).
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the scene. This is the master plan of this work, attaining as much objectivity as possible by 
going across (transcending) subjectivity.
If space and time have their foundation in the early experiences of life, interactions are 
a rather different matter. Interactions are not objects in space. Forces are metaphysical enti-
ties responsible for the departure from inertial motion, they have no time since causes are 
only made apparent by their effects: the gravitational interaction is present before, during 
and after the fall of an object. Forces can only be recognised by their effects and character-
ised using the established framework in a process of inference. The first law of motion has 
then a stronger support that the other two; the result is independent of the way we charac-
terise interactions. The second law and even more the third are in a good degree the result 
of promissory assumptions. Newton, in search of credibility for the principle of action and 
reaction, relies on contact forces that impress us in a sensory form (“If you press a stone 
with your finger, the finger is also pressed by the stone” ((Motte) Newton 1687)). In our 
discussion we explore to what extent the principle of action and reaction is a result of NAP, 
restricting our discussion to forces of instantaneous action. The result is a generalised prin-
ciple of action and reaction. Thus, Newton’s third law has a weaker logical support than the 
first and second laws. If classical forces are ever found that break reflection symmetry, we 
expect total linear momentum not to be conserved by the interaction.
Apart from assumptions of technical character and others suggested by observation, the 
present approach rests on a principle of knowledge (derived from NAP), namely that the 
relative properties of a pair of interacting objects depend only on the objects themselves 
and their interaction. Thus, we develop the concept of objective relative distance. Indeed, 
the construction rests on the resolution of the tension between objective and subjective. 
In this sense, we get past the traditional issue present in Leibniz, Newton and later Mach 
and Poincaré (see below) about “absolute” and “relative” distances. The quest here is to 
objectivise relative distances. The present work disposes of absolute space, while retaining 
objectivity. Another basic underlying idea is that the concepts of space and time are differ-
ent. Space is related to permanence and time to change. In particular, space and time are 
not interchangeable. This is based in the way we construct our knowledge.
7  On the Laws of Nature
In a society that rests on religious concepts it makes sense to consider that Nature is a crea-
tion of God and that She/He endowed Nature with laws. As religious beliefs decline and 
faith in our own strength grows, we come to accept that the laws of Nature are actually 
laws produced by humanity to understand Nature, they are laws for the understanding of 
Nature, constructs generated to organise the sensory world, the continuation at the level of 
civilisation of the work autonomously initiated by every child. As such, the laws of Nature 
are subject to a higher set of rules, those discovered by every member of our species in our 
early quest for survival. They include the conviction that “there is something out there” 
that reaches us through our senses (call it Nature) and therefore, the possibility of objective 
knowledge.
Unlike social rules, on which we agree in order to preserve energies for other relevant 
social matters and are established by consensus or power, unlike the “agreement on disa-
greeing” that makes room for cooperation by setting aside disputes, Truth is the only form 
of agreement with Nature, as Nature is not a social actor that can change behaviour or 
negotiate the rules. But Truth requires an agreement with our humanity as well. Thus, the 
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laws of Nature or truth about Nature come as a result of the dialectic interplay between 
a universal (humanwise- or civilisationwise) subject and the universe of sensory obser-
vations, Nature. None of them can be absent in the laws of Nature. In turn, the univer-
sal subject requires a correspondence between the individuals, it requires intersubjectiv-
ity. Intersubjectivity sets the lower level of requisites on the side of the subject for calling 
something a law of Nature.
Much of our understanding of Nature comes from what we call “dialectical openings 
to knowledge”. Thus, the recognition of ourselves requires the simultaneous recognition 
of not-ourselves, our environment. Likewise, the motion of isolated bodies, the inertial 
motion, has its necessary opponent in the motion of bodies that interact. At first sight, we 
could have introduced just unilateral action since the opponent of isolated is not-isolated, 
i.e., influenced by (or influencing) others. But such an idea contradicts the higher level of 
reasoning, the rules on rules, one of them being the No Arbitrariness Principle (NAP). Do 
we have a reason to support that one body can influence another without being influenced, 
that there is an asymmetry among bodies? So far, the answer is no.
The present approach is not just discursive, it is constructive as well. Let us see how it 
works on a much debated matter.
7.1  The Speed of Light
During a large part of the nineteenth century and well into the following century, a num-
ber of attempts to measure the speed of light and to understand its constancy were done. 
These attempts were mostly independent of the electromagnetic theory of light (at most, 
the wave-like properties of light were used). Experiments such as those by Fizeau in 1848, 
later developed and improved by Cornu in 1872–1874 (1876) (using a light source/detec-
tor, a rotating cogwheel and a mirror at rest relative to the source/detector) consider that 
there exists a light path and that the event “detect the light” occurs at a later time than the 
event “turn on the light”. The measuring issue can hence be regarded as purely kinemati-
cal, although the connection between light and electrodynamics was advanced already in 
the mid 1800’s. The final outcome of these efforts has been that the “speed of light” is 
constant and also that this constancy is incompatible with Newtonian mechanics. In this 
section we will show that under the present approach based on NAP the last assertion is 
incorrect.
7.1.1  The View of this Work
In the first place, we must raise the objection that light, being a perception resulting from 
the electromagnetic interaction, is not an object. Hence, what is meant by “the speed of 
light” needs to be explained. What is truly measured in Fizeau’s or Cornu’s experiments 
is a distance and a time-interval. The quotient of both has the dimensions of a velocity so 
we may agree to consider it a velocity. A view compatible with NAP, is to consider that all 
three events related to the measurements (emission, reflection and detection) are actually 
the result of a common cause, namely, the electromagnetic interaction.
Whatever we make in our interpretation of light, it is undeniable that what we have 
called the speed of light is the quotient between an objective distance and an intersubjec-
tive time interval. The result is objective (or rather intersubjective) and it is subject to the 
laws of transformations of objective quantities, this is, it is the same for all observers.
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7.1.2  The (Traditional) Mediator View
The main step in the traditional conception of light is to interpret the measured quotient 
in terms of the velocity of a body or a material wave, something that has a place in space. 
Since interactions are not matter, in principle this interpretation introduces a fundamen-
tal belief: interactions are mediated by substantial entities that as such have a place in 
space. As far as we know, neither this assumption nor its rational/philosophical basis is 
ever stated. Interactions do not have a place, interactions require two places and relative 
distances, such as the relative distance between source/detector and mirror. If we want to 
associate the events emission, reflection and detection in terms of traditional causal rela-
tions it will have to be in the order: turn on the light, reflect the light at the mirror, detect 
the light. The cause (in the modern sense discussed at the Introduction) of our detection 
of light cannot have ceased by the time of the detection. Since without turning on the light 
there is no light to be detected, and the same can be said when the mirror is not in place, 
both the presence of the mirror and the turning on of the light are within the determinants 
of the detected light. However, the observed events are not the causes in themselves since 
the first event might very well have ceased when the third event happens. Similarly, the 
detected light immediately associated with the turn-on event could only be a cause if it 
travelled (matter-like) in space. The interpretation in terms of a material analogous allows 
for questions that do not correspond to what it is truly measured.
Equating a subjective quantity such as |va
L
| (the velocity of an interpreted material point 
L with respect to a reference a) with an objective quantity such as C (namely a constant, 
and hence objective and invariant) is, to say the least, confusing. A possible construction 
could be to consider Δt as subjective, since after all, absolute time was an assumption of 
Newtonian mechanics. If space is still to be conceived as absolute, then time might very 
well depend on the velocity of the reference system with respect to absolute space.
Let us work out an exercise along this line of thought. We will tentatively assume as 
a new axiom a deeply rooted belief that we are not going to offer for examination:
Tacit belief 1 Interactions are mediated by substantial entities that as such have a place in 
space and a velocity.
Then, if the substantial entity moves in absolute space with a characteristic velocity, 
we would expect that it appears to us with different (and measurable) relative velocities 
depending on the relative motion of our system of references with respect to absolute 
space. However, experiments (interpreted in this frame of mind) indicate otherwise: we 
measure always the same velocity. Therefore, absolute time, absolute space, these meas-
urements and the present tacit belief have come into collision. We can ask ourselves 
what can we save from the wreckage? For the sake of the exercise, we insist in keeping 
the tacit belief alive. It has been argued that such a state of things is incompatible with 
Newtonian mechanics, but again, this is not the case. Is it possible that velocities trans-
form between different reference systems satisfying the existence of a universal velocity 
and the structure of Newtonian mechanics? The following Theorems give an affirmative 
solution.
Definition 9 Let U ∈
{
z ∈ ℝ3 ∶ |z| < C} , with |U| its Euclidean norm. Further, let 
g(U) = G(|U|) , where G is a strictly increasing continuous function such that G(0) = 1 and 
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lima→C− G(a) = ∞ . We advance that U will play the role of a velocity in the sequel. Then, 
for |U|, |V| < C we define velocity addition U ⊕ V  as
where addition in the rhs denotes standard vector addition in 3-space.
Theorem 2 (Nonlinear presentation of Galileo’s group) Velocity addition has the follow-
ing properties:
(a) |U|, |V| < C ⇒ |W| < C.
(b) U ⊕ 0 = U , i.e., 0 is the neutral element of velocity addition.
(c) U ⊕ V = V ⊕ U.
(d) For all U, the inverse of U is − U, i.e., U ⊕ (−U) = 0.
(e) Associativity: (W ⊕ V)⊕ U = W ⊕ (V ⊕ U).
Proof For most statements it is a matter of doing the algebra. For statement a), 
the function g(V)|V| is a bijection of the interval [0, C) onto the nonnegative reals. |U|, |V| < C ⇒ g(U)U + g(V)V <∞ , hence there is a unique |W| in [0, C) such that 
g(W)W =  g(U)U +  g(V)V. Statements b), c) and d) follow from the definition. Regard-
ing statement e), let A = W ⊕ V  and B = V ⊕ U . Applying the definition two 
times we have: A⊕ U = g(A)A + g(U)U = g(W)W + g(V)V + g(U)U . Similarly, 
W ⊕ B = g(W)W + g(B)B = g(W)W + g(V)V + g(U)U.  □
In this exercise we consider relative position and velocity as primary concepts. The addi-
tion of time intervals has to be deduced from the concepts of relative position and velocity.
Definition 10 We call velocity V (with |V| < C ) the vector satisfying Δx = VΔt . For any 
reference system, we call t subjective time, while T = t
g(V)
 is called proper time.
The following Theorem indicates that while this way of thinking rests on a subjective 
time, there exists an underlying intersubjective time as long as space is objective.
Theorem 3 Let O move with velocity V1 with respect to S and velocity V2 relative to the 
observer S′ , while S′ moves with velocity V3 relative to S, such that V1 = V2 ⊕ V3 . Let
and ΔTi =
Δti
g(Vi)
 for i = 1, 2, 3. Then the proper time is invariant, ΔT1 = ΔT2 = ΔT3 , if 
and only if distances in space are invariant.
Proof The distance between S and O can be determined both by S and by S′ . Invariance of 
distances is expressed as
U ⊕ V = W ⇔ g(W)W = g(U)U + g(V)V ,
Δx = V1Δt1
Δx� = V2Δt2
ΔSS� = V3Δt3 = −ΔS�S
dSO = Δx = Δx
� + ΔSS� = d
�
SO
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or, equivalently,
The last equality follows from the law of addition of velocities. Invariance of distance 
holds for all velocities U, V, W satisfying V = U ⊕W , if and only if
It follows that ΔT1 = ΔT2 = ΔT3 . The reverse implication follows by assuming 
ΔT1 = ΔT2 = ΔT3 and applying the previous reasoning in reverse order to obtain dSO = d�SO. 
 □
ΔT  can be interpreted as the time measured by an observer moving with the object, 
since in such a case we have g(0) = 1 and ΔT = Δt.
As far as we know, the physics emerging from this picture has not been studied. 
Certainly, we may imagine other alternatives to exit the contradictory situation. For 
instance, we could drop entirely Tacit belief 1, as in the view of this work, or try other 
forms of reconciliation such as e.g., keeping Tacit belief 1 while dropping both absolute 
space and time, as well as relative distance. This part of the story is well known.
We have shown that the argued need to abandon the Newtonian frame upon the 
requirement of a constant speed of light is not mandatory. On the contrary, this course 
of action is related to a bolder decision: to associate interactions with the exchange of 
substantial entities (i.e., to consider light an object) and subsequently opting for a solu-
tion without all three of absolute space, absolute time and invariant relative distance.
7.2  Poincaré’s Principle of Relativity and Related Principles
As we have already mentioned, the No Arbitrariness Principle relates to Leibniz’ principle 
of sufficient reason. Mach also used the principle of sufficient reason in the form of a “prin-
ciple of symmetry” (Mach 1919, p. 9). At the beginning of the twentieth century, a related 
principle became notorious, the principle of relativity presented by Poincaré  (1913,  p. 
107). “The motion of any system must obey the same laws, whether it be referred to fixed 
axes or to moving axes carrying along a rectilinear uniform motion. This is the principle of 
relative motion that forces upon us for two reasons: first, the commonest experiences con-
firm it, and second, the contrary hypothesis is singularly repugnant to the mind”. Poincaré 
hints us about the principle being a principle of knowledge (“not solely the result of experi-
ment”), but does not elaborate further. As we have shown, Poincaré’s principle belongs 
to the context of interactions, for in the description of interactions it should not matter 
which isolated body we take (arbitrarily) as reference for our calculations. This issue was 
advanced before in this work. Poincaré and Mach inherit the discussion between absolute 
and relative spaces already present in Leibniz–Clarke and Newton. They attempt to resolve 
this issue in different ways, most remarkably Mach reducing the cosmos to a set of empiri-
cal relations without subjects (observers). The present approach goes past this controversy 
by introducing the arbitrariness of the observer (and with her/him the concept of space) 
V1 = V2
Δt2
Δt1
+ V3
Δt3
Δt1
= V2
g(V2)
g(V1)
+ V3
g(V3)
g(V1)
.
Δt2
g(V2)
=
Δt1
g(V1)
Δt3
g(V3)
=
Δt1
g(V1)
.
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and subsequently eliminating the arbitrariness by focusing the understanding on objective 
or intersubjective elements. In short, this work takes sides for an objective and relative 
description of interactions, with the stress resting on its objective nature.
8  Summary and Conclusions
We have reconstructed Newtonian mechanics starting with a minimal realism (Lombardi 
and Pérez Ransanz 2012) that accepts as starting point the existence of a real, or objective, 
world. The analysis of this physical world, we called it Nature, proceeds through several 
constructive steps. Some of them consist in dialectical openings to understanding. The first 
opening is the opposition between objective and subjective: objective opposes not-objec-
tive, i.e., subjective, which is what comes from the knowing subject. Understanding Nature 
is the result of a dialectic interplay—or dialogue—between the knowing subject and the 
object being known. It is worth mentioning that the subject is not an individual in princi-
ple but rather humanity or society. Knowledge in this primary form cannot be objective, 
the subject needs to transcend (negate) her/his subjectivity if she/he is going to reach any 
possible objectivity. Hence, the subject establishes principles of reason such as the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason, which we have recast in mathematical terms under the name of 
No Arbitrariness Principle. Actually, it is not the subject by her/himself who establishes 
the principle but the subject in relation to Nature. There is no form in which the dialectic 
objective–subjective can be separated giving pre-eminence to one of the terms.
NAP recognises the role of symmetry groups as a basic tool for understanding. Sym-
metries contribute with more than just aesthetic appealing (Wigner 1964); they express the 
permanence of the laws of Nature beyond the arbitrariness of the knowing subject. Moreo-
ver, NAP—or in a broader sense the principle of sufficient reason—might have represented 
an adaptive advantage for the early humanity, allowing to elaborate consequences of our 
relation with Nature.
NAP appears, at first sight, related to Kant’s first formulation of the categorical impera-
tive “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it 
should become a universal law” (Kant 1993, 4:421). The requisite of universal application 
is precisely the action of removing all arbitrariness that may arise in the application of the 
maxim to different rational agents. A moral action must be free of arbitrariness. The asso-
ciated set of arbitrariness usually considered is that of the agents subjected to the law. In 
more common terms, we can say: no rational justice exists if the laws do not pass the test of 
being equal for all citizens. We believe that NAP is a fundamental principle of rationality 
that emerges in different forms for different contexts.
Important contributions to mechanics come from the early childhood where the notions 
of time and space are formed as a consequence of the active adaptation of the child to 
her/his environment. In this stage of our construction, concepts point toward perceptions 
rather than to other concepts. With the opening produced by the concepts of isolated and 
interacting comes the first mechanical law, the only law acceptable to NAP for the con-
dition of permanence of isolated objects. Repeated use of NAP in different contexts will 
finally unravel Newton’s laws. But these laws require an increasing number of assumptions 
regarding Nature. Indeed, Newton’s mechanics arises as the interplay of reason, idealisa-
tion and experience in our relation to Nature.
We address the laws of Nature not as rules proper to the objects, as in metaphysical 
realism (Lombardi and Pérez Ransanz 2012), but rather as laws for the understanding of 
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Nature generated by the interplay between subject and object. This position becomes quite 
evident when Galilean transformations of velocities are not alleged to be experimental laws 
but rather considered as a requisite for the suppression of contributions arbitrarily intro-
duced by the observer.
The adopted approach allows us to attain a higher level of consciousness on the strength 
of the different components that contribute to the construction of mechanics. There is a 
precedence between these components which can be better appreciated by considering the 
consequences of removing them: (a) the consequence of renouncing to logic and to the 
laws of understanding is not being able to understand the world, (b) renouncing to the early 
elaborations of primary concepts such as time and space leads to a dissociation between 
everyday life and physics, the latter becoming entirely pragmatic and justified a-posteriori 
(because it is convenient), (c) in contrast, modifying our temporary beliefs has no real cost 
other than the effort of reconstructing our understanding on a more solid basis. Moreover, 
the present approach allows for a critical view of further developments, since it opens for 
new alternatives to the current views in different issues, alternatives that we believe should 
be explored to decide their worth.
An important reflection corresponds to the use of tacit beliefs (also known, in mathe-
matics, as hidden assumptions or hidden lemmas). Inasmuch as they are hidden and as such 
can escape the scrutiny of reason, they must be considered dangerous (Lissack 2017). They 
elude the principle of necessary reason and usually protect something that is not explicitly 
mentioned. In the case of Tacit belief 1, it hides the fact that we support the argument in 
a material model, be it wave or particle, on the basis that we cannot imagine it otherwise. 
Our imagination works with memories of the sensible world and in doing so it limits its 
value to the material experience. “Because we are not able to imagine otherwise” appears 
to us as an extremely weak argument: the confession of a limitation does not constitute a 
reason. We can explore the possibilities of the hidden assumption but we should be ready 
to abandon it if it comes into conflict with higher principles.
Scientific disciplines are not autonomous, they are ruled by reason, which is the only 
autonomous entity. The application of the principles of reason to understanding is known 
as critic. Critic in science needs not only be declared but it should be truly exercised. This 
work is indeed an exercise of critic. It seems proper to quote (Kant 1787, The discipline 
of reason) on this respect “...where reason is not held in a plain track by the influence of 
empirical or of pure intuition, that is, when it is employed in the transcendental sphere of 
pure conceptions, it stands in great need of discipline, to restrain its propensity to overstep 
the limits of possible experience and to keep it from wandering into error. In fact, the util-
ity of the philosophy of pure reason is entirely of this negative character.” The terms pure 
intuition and pure conceptions in Kant may be understood from: “Pure intuition conse-
quently contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure conception 
only the form of the thought of an object. Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are 
possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori.” (Kant 1787, p.75)
In conclusion, the construction of knowledge is not only a philosophical perspective but 
it is a constructive and critic method as well. Indeed, the history of knowledge has to rec-
ognise the contributions from metaphysical (unverifiable/irrefutable) ideas such as absolute 
space and later the reification of interactions. Changing the underlying metaphysics, great 
revolutions operate in physics, which is not automatically equal to great progresses. In 
these lines, recognising the need for introducing some metaphysics, the idea of a pluralist 
realism (Chang 2012; Lombardi and Pérez Ransanz 2012) should be considered not only 
as a description but rather as a programme. We might ask if the efforts of critical revision 
such as those of Mach or the present work could have been possible without the preceding 
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developments and their metaphysical ingredients. Critic, as the negative tool of philosophy, 
cannot operate in the void but can operate as self-criticism in the process of construction of 
knowledge.
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